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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. sections 1602 et seq.
(FSIA), provide the exclusive basis for suing a foreign sovereign in U.S.
courts. While the FSIA generally grants immunity to foreign sovereigns, it
also lays out a number of exceptions under which U.S. courts may exercise
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have thus used this statute as a basis to sue foreign
governments and their agencies and instrumentalities in a variety of
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contexts, ranging from purely commercial disputes to wrongful death
claims on behalf of victims of state-sponsored terrorism. The purpose of
this Review is to provide an overview of the primary areas of litigation
under the FSIA through an analysis of judicial decisions invoking the
statute in 2011.
INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2011LITIGATION involving foreign sovereigns in the United States is
on the rise. Since the year 2000, the number of reported decisions
discussing the FSIA has increased considerably. This increase is
attributable to a variety of circumstances that continued to play out in
FSIA jurisprudence in 2011.
Ever increasing globalization of business and the increased use of inter-
national arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism (with enforcement
left to domestic courts) have resulted in an increase in purely commercial
litigation involving foreign states. Consequently, substantial litigation in
2011 centered around the "commercial activity" exception under the
FSIA, including the pivotal questions of whether acts are "governmental"
or "commercial" when undertaken by sovereign entities or their agencies
and instrumentalities, and how close a nexus such acts must have to the
United States to fall within the statute's exemptions. While the courts
continue to grapple with these issues, the decisions in 2011 provided wel-
come guidance in this constantly evolving area of the FSIA.
Overall, FSIA cases in 2011 continued to address the core issues facing
foreign sovereigns in U.S. litigation, including:
* Who is a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts?
* What acts are sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to move forward with
U.S. litigation against foreign sovereign entities?
* When may plaintiffs pursue foreign sovereign assets located in the
United States to satisfy U.S. court judgments?
This Review will focus on the answers to those questions provided by
U.S. courts in 2011. The Review also includes a short introduction to the
FSIA as well as some practical guidance based on the most recent FSIA
decisions.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. As early as 1812 in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon,l U.S. courts generally declined to assert jurisdiction over cases
involving foreign government defendants, a practice rooted in a sense of
grace and comity between the United States and other nations. Judges
instead deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether such
cases should proceed in U.S. courts, exercising jurisdiction only where the
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
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U.S. State Department expressly referred claims for their consideration. 2
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department is-
sued the so-called "Tate Letter" announcing the Department's adoption
of a new "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity3 to guide
courts in invoking jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The Tate Letter
directed that state sovereigns continue to be entitled to immunity from
suits involving their sovereign, or "public," acts. But, acts taken in a com-
mercial, or "private," capacity no longer would be protected from U.S.
court review. Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to seek
the Executive Branch's views on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns-a system that
risked inconsistency and susceptibility to "diplomatic pressures rather
than to the rule of law." 4
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity, and empower-
ing the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch.5 Today, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.6
The FSIA provides that "foreign states"-including their "political
subdivision[s]" and "agenc[ies] or instrumentalit[ies]" 7-shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of the exceptions to immu-
nity set forth in the statute applies.8 The FSIA includes several provi-
sions that define the scope of a foreign state's immunity, and establishes
detailed procedural requirements for bringing claims against a sovereign
defendant.
The exceptions to immunity are set forth in sections 1605 and 1605A of
the FSIA. These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims based on
commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortious or terrorist
acts by foreign sovereign entities.9 In most instances, where a claim falls
under one of the FSIA exceptions, the Act provides that the foreign state
shall be subject to jurisdiction "in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual."10 The FSIA also includes separate provi-
sions establishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity) from the
attachment in aid of execution of a judgment against a foreign state or its
2. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (explaining
history of the FSIA).
3. Id. at 486-87.
4. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2011).
6. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2011).
8. See id. § 1604.
9. See id. H§ 1605-1605A.
10. See id. § 1606; but see id. § 1605A (providing federal statutory cause of action for
terrorism-related acts).
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agencies or instrumentalities, of property located in the United States.'
Finally, the FSIA sets forth various unique procedural rules for claims
against foreign states, including, e.g., special rules for service of process,
default judgments, and appeals.12
II. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES
A threshold issue in any case brought under the FSIA is whether the
defendant person or entity constitutes a "foreign state" for purposes of
the FSIA, and therefore is generally entitled to immunity from litigation
and judgment execution. For purposes of the FSIA, "foreign states" in-
clude not only the states themselves, but also agencies and instrumentali-
ties thereof.13 To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign
state, an entity must be a "separate legal person," that is "neither a citi-
zen of a State of the United States . . . nor created under the laws of any
third country" and either "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion" or an entity, "a majority of whose shares or other ownership inter-
est is owned by [the] foreign state or a political subdivision thereof."' 4
A. WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE?"
Whether an entity qualifies as a "foreign state" is a fundamental in-
quiry in any case brought under the FSIA because it determines whether
the entity will be able to assert sovereign immunity to defeat a court's
exercise of jurisdiction over it. If an entity is deemed to be a foreign
state, it may be sued in a U.S. court only if the claims fall within one or
more of the exceptions set forth in the statute.' 5
Determining whether an entity is a "foreign state" and therefore enti-
tled to the protections of the FSIA is a fact-specific inquiry, involving
careful attention to the specific nature and functions of each defendant.
The following decisions illustrate how U.S. courts have addressed the sta-
tus of a variety of entities under the FSIA in 2011.
11. See id. §§ 1610-11. For example, property belonging to "a foreign central bank or
monetary authority" and "held for its own account" is immune from suit absent a
waiver. § 1611(b)(1). Likewise, military property held by a military authority and
used or intended to be used in connection with a military activity is immune from
attachment. § 1611(b)(2).
12. See, e.g., id. §§ 1605(g), 1608.
13. Id. § 1603(a).
14. Id. § 1603(b). The phrase "not created under the laws of any third country" re-
flects the requirement that the entity must have been created under the laws of the
country of which it purports to be an "agency or instrumentality." See Aluminum
Distrib., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., 87 C 6477, 1989 WL 64174, *2
(N.D. Ill. June 8, 1989) ("GARMCO is created under the laws of Bahrain, one of
the owner nations. Hence, it is not created under the laws of a third nation, and it
is a foreign state under § 1603.")
15. Id. § 1604.
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1. Economic Agency - Not Foreign State
In the case In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation,16 the
district court found that an entity called the United Potato Growers of
Canada (UPGC) was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
entitled to immunity under the FSIA.17 UPGC's argument for immunity
under the FSIA was that it was an organ of a foreign state engaging in a
public activity on behalf of the foreign government.18 To determine
whether UPGC was an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state, the
court examined the following factors:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation;
(2) the purpose of its activities;
(3) its independence from the government;
(4) the level of government financial support;
(5) its employment policies; and
(6) its obligations and privileges under state law.
The court considered the circumstances surrounding how UPGC's
member agencies came to form the entity, finding that "[a] province did
not instruct or direct the member agencies to establish UPGC or any
other subsidiary that would assist it with its sovereign functions."' 9 The
court further held that the purpose of UPGC's activities was to "dissemi-
nate information about the production and marketing of potatoes," which
weighs against finding that it qualifies as an organ of a foreign state.20
Moreover, the court found that the government neither controlled nor
financially supported the entity.21 The court further concluded that
"[t]he final two factors, UPGC's employment policies and UPGC's obli-
gations and privileges under state law, do not tip the scale in either direc-
tion."2 2 The reason was that UPGC had one part-time employee who
was not a public servant, and while "[e]mployment of civil servants is
indicative of an organ of government . . . it is not dispositive. Moreover,
it does not appear that any savings UPGC receives as a non-profit
amounts to substantial financial support." 23 Thus, "[b]ased on an evalua-
tion of all six factors," the court concluded that "the scale tips decidedly
in favor of finding that UPGC is not an organ of a foreign state."24
2. European Community
In May 2011, the district court looked to the FSIA's definition of a
"foreign state" to assist in determining whether the European Commu-
16. In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Idaho
2011).
17. Id. at 1178.
18. Id. at 1177.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1177-78.





144 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
nity (EC) was a "foreign state" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.25 While the case was not brought under the FSIA, the court
nevertheless engaged in a robust analysis using FSIA case law as a guide
and found that the EC is neither a foreign state, nor a political subdivi-
sion of a foreign state, nor an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state.26
As part of its FSIA analysis, the court first borrowed from the Supreme
Court's analysis in Samantar v. Yousuf, 2 7 which observed that a "foreign
state" under the FSIA "generally 'indicates a body politic that governs a
particular territory.'"28 The district court then found that the EC was an
international organization rather than a foreign state, did not exercise
control over its territories, and did not abrogate its member states' pow-
ers of international sovereignty, including the ability to "receive ambassa-
dors, sign treaties and wage war." 29 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the EC was not a "foreign state" under the FSIA. 30
The court also determined that the EC was neither a political subdivi-
sion or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, but rather a sepa-
rate, legal person.31 The court considered similar factors to the court in
In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, specifically:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose;
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity;
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees
and pays their salaries;
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [for-
eign] country; and
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.3 2
The court observed that the treaty governing the EC provided for its
separate legal personhood, and, while the EC was created for a "na-
tional" purpose, the Member States did not actively supervise the entity,
"did not require the hiring of employees that could be deemed public
employees of the Member States," and rejected notions that the EC was
an "organ" of their states under the EC Member States' own laws.3 3 The
court found that "[t]hese factors all point[ed] to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the European Community really is a supranational body, truly
independent of the governments of the Member States," and therefore
25. European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 189, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying the FSIA definition of a "foreign state" from 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) to
determine diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
26. Id. at 208; see generally id.
27. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
28. European Cmty., 814 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (quoting Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2286).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 199-200.
31. Id. at 200 (holding that "the European Community is a separate legal person for
the purposes of the FSIA.").
32. Id. at 202 (citing Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2009)).
33. Id. at 207-08.
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did not fall within any of the FSIA's definitions of a foreign state.34
B. "GOVERNMENTAL" VERSUS "COMMERCIAL" ACTIVITIES:
THE "CORE FUNCTIONS TEST"
As to certain issues, an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign sover-
eign may be subject to different statutory rules than the "foreign state"
itself or its political subdivisions. In particular, rules relating to service of
process, venue, the availability of punitive damages, and attachment of
assets can differ depending on whether the defendant is deemed an
agency of the state or the state itself.3 5 To make this determination,
courts apply the so-called "core functions test." 36 Under this test, if the
entity's predominant activities ("core functions") are "governmental" in
nature, courts will treat the entity as if it were the state itself and apply
rules and standards that are more protective of the sovereign.37 But, if
the entity's "core functions" are predominantly "commercial" in charac-
ter, courts will apply the less protective rules and standards reserved for
agencies and instrumentalities of the state.38
In 2011, in Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq,39 the Fourth
Circuit applied the "core functions" test to determine whether the Iraq
Ministry of Defense (IMOD) was an agency or instrumentality of Iraq,
and thus legally separate from the foreign state, or a political subdivision
of the state itself.4 0 The plaintiff contractor sued IMOD for breach of
contract when IMOD failed to make required contractual payments
under a contract to refurbish and dispose of Iraqi military equipment. 41
As part of its contract, the plaintiff performed acts in the United States
such as "accounting, computer programming, contacting agents of foreign
nations, etc." 42 And the contract related to IMOD's commercial activi-
ties abroad. Applying the "core functions" test, the court held that "the
core functions of the IMOD-waging war and defending the state-are
inherently governmental." 4 3 Accordingly, the court held that for FSIA
purposes, "Iraq and IMOD are legally one and the same" and so IMOD
enjoyed broader sovereignty protection. 44 Even so, because the acts chal-
lenged by the plaintiff were commercial in nature, they triggered the
"commercial activity" exception under the FSIA and effectively waived
34. Id. at 208.
35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)-(b) (2011) (service of process); § 1391(f)(3) (permit-
ting venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state "in any
judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or
is doing business"); § 1610(a)-(b) (attachment of assets).





41. Id. at 206.
42. Id. at 216.
43. Id. at 215.
44. Id.
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IMOD's sovereign immunity in the case. 45
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY
Once a court determines that an entity constitutes a foreign state (or an
agency or instrumentality) potentially entitled to immunity, it must next
determine whether an exception to that immunity applies. Decisions
from 2011 addressing those exceptions are discussed below.
A. WAIVER - SECTION 1605(A)(1)
The FSIA provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, not-
withstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver .... 46
In 2011, the courts addressed a broad range of issues under the waiver
exception, including: (1) whether a non-party to a treaty can use that
treaty to demonstrate waiver by a party state, (2) whether choice of law
and forum selection clauses survive nationalization of an entity and waive
the immunity of the newly-nationalized entity, (3) whether responding to
subpoenas implicitly waives immunity, (4) whether waiver of jurisdic-
tional immunity also constitutes waiver of the right to a non-jury trial,
and (5) whether waiver by a parent state operates to waive immunity of
all subsidiary entities under an alter ego theory.
Waiver by Treaty. In Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP v.
Anglo Irish Bank Corp., the district court addressed two theories of
waiver proffered by the plaintiffs-two Cayman Island limited partner-
ships that held $200 million in notes from defendant Anglo Irish Bank
Corp.47 The Irish government, which nationalized the bank in 2009,48 as-
serted sovereign immunity. 49 The plaintiffs countered that Ireland had
impliedly waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the Friendship
Treaty of 1950-an agreement between the United States and Ireland
which provided that "[n]o enterprise of either Party which is publicly
owned or controlled shall, if it engages in ... business activities within the
territories of the other Party, claim or enjoy . . . immunity therein
from . .. suit."50 Despite the existence of this treaty, the court held that
the plaintiffs, as non-parties to the bilateral agreement, could not avail
45. Id. (noting that the plaintiff's same allegations were "sufficient to bring a claim
against Iraq [IMOD] within the FSIA's commercial activities exception.").
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2011).
47. Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP v. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., No. 11
Civ. 0955, 2011 WL 6187077, at *1, 8-11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *6.
50. Id. at *9 (quoting Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Ir., art.
XV(3), Jan. 21, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 785).
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themselves of the treaty as a basis for jurisdiction. As the court held
"[w]hen the case involves an implied waiver ... a court should be even
more hesitant to extend the waiver in favor of third parties. [S]uch a
waiver will not be implied absent strong evidence of the sovereign's
intent."51
Waiver by Agreement of a Subsequently Nationalized Entity. The
plaintiffs in Fir Tree Capital further argued that when the Irish govern-
ment nationalized the bank, the choice of law and forum selection clauses
contained in the notes prior to the nationalization had the effect of waiv-
ing sovereign immunity for the state-owned successor. 52 Distinguishing
several cases cited by the plaintiffs, the court held that the Irish govern-
ment had not expressly assumed the choice of law and forum selection
provisions. 53 Without a "case suggesting that a nationalized entity may
be found to have waived sovereign immunity because of an agreement
entered into by its private sector predecessor," the court "concluded that
the Irish government [had] not waived sovereign immunity." 54
Waiver by Responding to Subpoenas. In Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of
India, the district court found implicit waiver by defendant Bank of India
where the Bank responded twice to subpoenas and failed to timely assert
its immunity.55 The Bank responded to the subpoenas but never filed a
responsive pleading. 56 After plaintiff Eitzen Bulk moved to compel full
compliance with the subpoenas, the Bank asserted sovereign immunity,
arguing that it could not be held to have waived immunity prior to filing a
responsive pleading.57 The court noted that the time to respond had
lapsed,58 but "[m]ore importantly," the Bank had responded to Eitzen
Bulk's subpoenas "without objecting on the basis of sovereign immu-
nity." 59 The court held that the Bank's conduct constituted an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity.60
Waiver of Right to Non-Jury Trial. In Aboeid v. Saudi Arabian Air-
lines, Inc., the district court held that a waiver of sovereign immunity
under a Department of Transportation (DOT) Permit did not waive the
FSIA provision granting sovereign defendants the right to a non-jury
51. Id. at *8 (quoting Cargill Intern S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1017
(2d Cir. 1993)).
52. Id. at *10. The Notes included a Note Purchase Agreement stating that the bank
would submit to the jurisdiction of "'courts of the State of New York or the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York."' (capitalization in
original); Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *10-11.
54. Id. at *11.
55. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) (2011)) (requiring "an answer or other responsive
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trial. 61 The plaintiff demanded a jury trial in its complaint against Saudi
Arabian Airlines (SAA). 62 SAA moved to strike the jury demand. 63 In
granting SAA's motion, the court clarified that a waiver of jurisdictional
immunity should not be construed to reach other "rights and privileges
afforded by the FSIA"64 such as the non-jury provision of 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1441(d). 65 The court further noted that "[tihe waiver language in the
[DOT] Permit assert[ed] that operations by the defendant 'constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1605(a).'" 6 6
That provision provides that "a foreign state may no[t] assert immunity
from the jurisdiction of United States courts if 'the foreign state has
waived its immunity expressly or by implication.' 67 Given this "explicit
reference to the FSIA in the DOT's waiver," the court found that "it
would be entirely anomalous to interpret the waiver to exclude the defen-
dant from all of the other provisions of the FSIA" as well.6 8
Waiver Under an Alter Ego Theory. In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina, the district court addressed whether a complaint contained
sufficient factual allegations to impute waiver by a parent state to a sub-
sidiary under an alter ego theory.69 Prior to bringing the action, plaintiff
NML Capital, Ltd. (NML) won several judgments against defendant Re-
public of Argentina (Republic). 70 Because of expected challenges in en-
forcing judgments against the Republic, NML also sued defendant
Energia Argentina S.A. (ENARSA) and sought to have it declared an
alter ego of the Republic, subject to the government's own waiver of im-
munity.71 While acknowledging "that the Republic had a substantial de-
gree of control over ENARSA," the court held that the complaint did not
allege the right type of control to support an alter ego theory.72 Yet the
court's opinion provided some hints as to what a plaintiff would need to
allege to succeed on such a theory.73 Specifically, the court observed that
61. Aboeid v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, Inc., No. CV-1 0-2518, 2011 WL 2222140, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011). SAA had waived sovereign immunity for merits pur-
poses "by operating as a foreign air carrier in the United States pursuant to a
permit issued by the Department of Transportation." Id. at *2.
62. Id. at *2; cf. Fiuo. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
63. Aboeid, 2011 WL 2222140, at *2; cf. FEDo. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2).
64. Aboeid, 2011 WL 2222140, at *3.
65. See id. at *3 n.1; see also id. at *3 ("The waiver upon which the plaintiffs rely here
does not say anything about non-jury trials.").
66. Id. at *4 (quoting DOT Permit) (emphasis in original).
67. Id.
68. Id. Right to a non-jury trial under § 1441(d) is one of the FSIA's provisions. See
History, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(d). In fact, § 1441(d) is § 6 of the FSIA. See Oct. 21,
1976, P.L. 94-583, § 6, 90 Stat. 2898. Other provisions of the FSIA are codified at
Title 28, §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), and 1602-1611.
69. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 09 Civ. 7013, 2011 WL 524433, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *7.
73. See id. The court granted NML leave to amend its complaint. Id. at *8. NML
filed an Amended Complaint on July 21, 2011, but "did not seek to strengthen its
case of alter ego" and in fact seemed to abandon the theory altogether. Id. at *1
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NML did not sufficiently allege "that the Republic managed the day-to-
day business of ENARSA or disposed of the funds of ENARSA in any
abnormal manner or in any way designed to treat such funds as funds of
the Republic." 74 Even "'dictat[ing] the quantity, price of purchase, and
price of sale for ENARSA's natural gas transactions"' was not sufficient
where the complaint did not allege more frequent intervention. 5 Practi-
tioners addressing similar situations involving a possible veil-piercing
analysis should thus consider both the scope and frequency of acts pur-
portedly establishing control by the parent over the subsidiary for pur-
poses of establishing jurisdiction under the FSIA.
B. COMMERCIAL AcriviTy - SECTION 1605(A)(2)
Increased government involvement in commercial affairs, whether re-
sulting from ongoing intervention following the 2008 financial crisis or
from increased involvement by state-centered regimes like China's, has
led to the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA being frequently
invoked as a basis for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns. This exception to foreign sovereign immunity provides that a
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in
any case:
in which the action is based: [(1)] upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state, or [(2)] upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere, or [(3)] upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activ-
ity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States .... 76
In other words, foreign states lose their immunity from lawsuits in the
United States where their actions at issue in the lawsuit are: (1) commer-
cial, and (2) have a nexus to the United States (i.e., are carried out, or
cause a direct effect, in the United States).
1. What Acts Are Considered "Commercial"?
In distinguishing between "commercial" and "governmental" acts, the
FSIA expressly requires that acts be defined by their nature, not their
purpose.77 For example, the act of selling bonds to raise government
funds to enter into a construction contract is "commercial" in nature,
even if the contract is for a seemingly "governmental," non-commercial,
("Whereas the original complaint had expressly cited Bancec [a particular case
discussing alter ego] as the legal basis for its claim, Bancec is not referred to in the
amended complaint.").
74. NML Capital, 2011 WL 524433, at *7.
75. Id. (quoting Compl. 36); see also id. at *7. ("[T]he claim that the Republic inter-
vened in the daily transactions and affairs of ENARSA, if there is such a claim, is
not developed in the complaint with any specific detail.") (emphasis added).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008).
77. See id. § 1603(d).
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purpose such as building an embassy compound. Often, the cases are not
so straightforward. But in 2011, cases dealing with this issue generally
adhered to established distinctions between "commercial" and "govern-
mental" acts.
Following an enduring principle, courts in 2011 followed the Supreme
Court's guidance in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., that a foreign
sovereign's actions are "commercial" when it acts as a private player in
the market rather than as a regulator.78 In this light, the courts followed
prior distinctions and found several acts to be commercial in nature in-
cluding: selling bonds in the United States,79 negotiating and settling legal
claims,80 transferring money into the United States for a sovereign-owned
corporation to purchase a United States-based entity,8' and contracting
for the purchase of goods, services, and technology. 82
On the other hand, when the government acts as a regulator, e.g.,
makes "decisions regarding whether or how to investigate an allegedly
fraudulent commercial transaction between private parties, regulate ex-
ports, enforce criminal laws, and seize property during criminal investiga-
tions," the government acts as a sovereign and not as a commercial
actor.83
Some cases decided in 2011 help the sovereign and the practitioner
alike know where to draw the line between "commercial" and "govern-
mental" acts:
* Sale of Bank Assets - Commercial: In Fir Tree Capital Opportunity
Master Fund, LP v. Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd, the district court
determined that a state-owned bank's merger and sale of assets were
commercial acts.84 The plaintiffs, affiliates of a New York invest-
ment firm, owned $200 million of notes issued in the United States
by defendant Anglo Irish Bank.85 The Republic of Ireland national-
ized the bank in 2009 following the 2008 global financial crisis.86 The
plaintiffs alleged that after its nationalization, the bank began liqui-
78. See, e.g., Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 764 F. Supp.2d
122, 127 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 614 (1992)).
79. Bleier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, et al., No. 08 C 06254, 2011 WL 4626164, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011) ("The alleged marketing and sale of bonds in the
United States fits readily within the definition of 'commercial activity.'").
80. Fagan v. Republic of Austria, No. 08 Civ. 6715, 2011 WL 1197677, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2011).
81. Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.-Petrobras, 409 F. App'x
787, 289 (5th Cir. 2011).
82. Servaas, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, No. 10-828-cv, 2011 WL 454501, at *1 (2d Cir.
Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that "contracting for the purchase of goods, services and
technology-is quintessentially commercial").
83. Cmty. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Republic of Kenya, 663 F. 3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2011)
(dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiffs alleged that Kenyan gov-
ernment failed adequately to prevent plaintiffs' loss or to restore the lost funds).
84. Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP v. Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd., No.
11 Civ. 0955, 2011 WL 6187077, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id.
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dating its assets, including a U.S.-based loan portfolio, at steep dis-
counts and, pursuant to an order by the High Court of Ireland, had
begun to formulate a plan for a merger with another bank.87 Con-
cerned about their investment, plaintiffs sought an order enjoining
the bank from entering into the merger or selling its assets and re-
quiring the bank to leave sufficient assets in the United States to
satisfy its obligations to plaintiffs. The bank argued that the acts
were not "commercial" because they had been ordered by the High
Court.
The court rejected this argument. Because the nature of the acts-
the sale of assets and merger with another bank-were "the type of
actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or com-
merce,"' the court considered the bank's actions to be "commercial"
in nature rather than "governmental."8 8 The court further observed
that, "because a foreign instrumentality such as a nationalized or
central bank presumably always acts at the volition of a foreign gov-
ernment," if it held that acts compelled by the government were sov-
ereign in nature, "the commercial activity exception would be
rendered nugatory."
* Purchase of Licensing and Distribution Rights - Commercial: In
CYBERsitter, LLC v. People's Republic of China, the district court
asserted jurisdiction over the People's Republic of China (PRC) in a
suit alleging misappropriation of computer software code.89 The
PRC had purchased from plaintiffs a one-year distribution license for
a program known as "Green Dam." The PRC then allegedly made
the program available worldwide on the Internet for free download-
ing, including on its own official site, and used propaganda to en-
courage Chinese speakers worldwide to download the program. The
court concluded that because "entities other than a sovereign state
can purchase licenses for software programs and, in turn, sublicense
such programs to other actors[,]" it was irrelevant "[w]hether the
PRC conducted this business for a governmental purpose." 90
* Negotiation, Investigation, and Settlement of a Legal Claim - Com-
mercial: In Fagan v. Republic of Austria, the district court held that a
sovereign engages in commercial activity when it participates in the
settlement of a legal claim.91 The court noted that such activity "is
not 'peculiarly within the realm of governments,' but rather is an ac-
tivity 'which private parties ordinarily perform." 92 So to the extent
that a sovereign engages in settlement alongside private entities, it is
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id. at *13 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. v. P.T.
Jamsostek (Persero), 600 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2010).
89. CYBERsitter, LLC v. People's Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (C.D.
Cal. 2011).
90. Id. at 976.
91. Fagan v. Republic of Austria, No. 08 Civ. 6715(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 1197677, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).
92. Id. at *9.
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engaging in a commercial activity.93
2. What Acts Create a Nexus with the United States?
Once a court considers an act to be "commercial" under the FSIA, it
must then determine whether the act has a sufficient nexus with the
United States to fall within the commercial activity exception. A nexus is
established in one of three ways: (1) the foreign sovereign conducts the
commercial act in the United States, (2) the act takes place in the United
States in connection with commercial activity abroad, or (3) the sovereign
acts outside of the United States in connection with the sovereign's com-
mercial activity but causes a "direct effect" in the United States.94
Acts in the United States by Foreign States. The first clause of the
exception permits jurisdiction over commercial acts carried out in the
United States by foreign states. The courts did not address this exception
in 2011. But, practitioners should be mindful that issues with this excep-
tion may occur when questions arise as to the authority of the individual
whose acts are the subject of the claim to bind a sovereign.
Acts in the United States in Connection with Commercial Activity
Abroad. The second exception provides for jurisdiction where the chal-
lenged acts are taken in the United States that relate to the sovereign's
commercial activity abroad. As with the first clause, for the exception to
apply, the acts in the United States must be not only "in connection with"
the commercial activity of the foreign state, but also must be sufficient to
form the basis of the suit itself. The key difference is that, for this second
clause to apply, the acts taken in the United States do not themselves
have to be taken by the foreign state, but can be the plaintiff's own acts.
For example, in Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, the
plaintiff performed acts in the United States such as "accounting, com-
puter programming, contacting agents of foreign nations, etc." as part of
its contract with Iraq's Ministry of Defense.95 The contract was related to
the Ministry's commercial activities abroad, and the plaintiff's claim was
for breach of contract with the Ministry. Consequently, these acts were
sufficient to show that the claim was based on upon "an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere." 96 And the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to exercise jurisdiction over the claim.97
Acts Outside the United States that Cause a "Direct Effect" in the
United States. The third clause of the exception grants United States
courts jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the United States, but
which cause a "direct effect" in the United States. This third category is
often the subject of litigation because of the lack of clarity over what
93. Id.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008).
95. Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205, 216 (4th Cir. 2011).
96. Id. at 215.
97. Id. at 217.
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constitutes a "direct effect" (as opposed to an "indirect" effect) in the
United States.
Still, there are some basic principles the courts have applied when de-
termining whether a sovereign has taken action that causes a "direct ef-
fect" in the United States. For example, "[t]o be a 'direct' effect within
the meaning of the [exception], the impact need not be either substantial
or foreseeable; rather, 'an effect is direct if it follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant's activity." 98 But, "jurisdiction may not
be predicated on purely trivial effects in the United States." 99 As one
court stated: "Congress did not intend to provide jurisdiction whenever
the ripples caused by an overseas transaction manage eventually to reach
the shores of the United States."100 The courts are not uniform on the
type of act required to find a "direct effect," with some courts requiring
the act to be "legally significant" to have a direct effect in the United
States, while others, including the Sixth Circuit, have expressly rejected
such a requirement.' 0
In 2011, several cases considered the "direct effects" category to confer
or deny jurisdiction based on the FSIA's commercial activity exception.
These cases followed the general rule that courts will not find "direct ef-
fects" where "[tihe only effects of [an] activity felt in the United States
[a]re side effects of the plaintiffs' U.S. citizenship and residence."10 2 But,
several decisions provide further guidance on what does qualify as a "di-
rect effect."
Selling Counterfeit Products Overseas - Direct Effect: In Bell Heli-
copter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, defendant Islamic
Republic of Iran manufactured allegedly counterfeit military and ci-
vilian models of Bell Helicopter's 206 Model Helicopter Series.103
The models in question used Bell Helicopter's well-recognized trade
dress, but they were of a "lower quality and likely ha[d] poorer per-
formance characteristics" than Bell's models.104 Iran then marketed
these counterfeits to the global market through the government's an-
nual international air show held in Iran. The district court found that
Iran's acts "likely result[ed] in consumer confusion" and thereby "di-
lute[d] [Bell Helicopter's] famous mark" because consumers who
thought they were purchasing a Bell Helicopter were really purchas-
ing a substandard product. 05 Accordingly, the court held that Iran's
98. Gosain v. State Bank of India, 414 F. App'x 311, 313 (2d Cir. 2011).
99. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
100. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1238
(10th Cir. 1994).
101. Compare, e.g., Gosain, at 313-14 with Westfield v. Federal Republic of Germany,
633 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).
102. Fagan v. Republic of Austria, No. 08 Civ. 6715(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 1197677, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).
103. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 764 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.
D.C. 2011).
104. Id. at 128
105. Id. at 126, 128.
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manufacture and marketing of the knock-off helicopters had a direct
effect in the United States by tarnishing Bell's reputation and good
will.106
* Intent to Transfer Property to the United States - No Direct Effect:
In Westfield v. Federal Republic of Germany, the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed the question whether an act by a foreign sovereign passes the
"direct effect" test if the sovereign's acts prevent a third-party from
transferring funds or goods to the United States. 0 7 In Westfield,
heirs of an art dealer sued Germany based on the Nazis' seizure of
the dealer's art collection and sale at auction in the 1930s. The Sixth
Circuit found that Germany's acts were "commercial" but that the
exception did not apply because the government's actions had no
"direct effect" in the United States. 08 The court said it was "very
sympathetic" to the plaintiffs' claims, but held that the art dealer's
unfulfilled intent to send his collection to relatives in Nashville, Ten-
nessee, caused only an "indirect" or "derivative" effect in the United
States.109 According to the court, "finding a direct effect based on
plans to send property to the United States would largely eliminate
the protections of sovereign immunity.""i0 "Concluding otherwise
would effectively read the 'direct' requirement out of the statute and
greatly expand the jurisdiction of our courts in contrast to Congress's
goals in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act."'" The
court analogized its ruling to prior decisions holding that a foreign
country's failure to pay monies owed does not cause direct effects in
the United States merely because the entity entitled to receive the
funds planned to move the funds to the United States.' 12
* Financial Loss Resulting from Conversion and Property Damage in a
Foreign Country - No Direct Effect: In Hammerstein v. The Federal
Republic of Germany the district court reiterated the oft-cited princi-
ple that the mere suffering of an economic loss in the United States,
without more, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the sover-
eign entity that causes the loss." 3 The court also highlighted the sig-
nificance, in cases where loss is predicated on the payment of money,
on whether the payments were required to be made from the United
States or whether the location of payment was merely fortuitous.
The plaintiff in the case had fled to the United States from Germany
in the 1930s. Her family's property had been taken by the Nazis,
used as a Gestapo headquarters and prison until the end of World
War II, and then used as a hospital by East Germany until reunifica-
106. Id. at 127.
107. Westerfield, 633 F.3d at 412.
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id. at 417.
110. Id. at 416.
111. Id. at 417.
112. Id. at 416.
113. Hammerstein v. The Federal Republic of Germany, No. 09-CV-443 (ARR)(RLM),
2011 WL 9975796, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. August 1, 2011).
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tion. In the 1990s, ownership of the property was restored to the
plaintiff and she began paying property taxes to the government.
But after a series of legal battles, the German Ministry of Finance
notified plaintiff that she did not, in fact, own the property and
therefore was not required to pay taxes on it. Because the Ministry
of Finance would not refund the taxes, the plaintiff filed suit.114
The court found that the commercial activity exception to the FSIA
did not apply. It reasoned that the government's alleged misuse of
the property and receipt of taxes did not have a "direct effect" in the
United States even though plaintiff had made the tax payments from
the United States. The fact that the plaintiff paid taxes and fees to
Germany from New York was not significant "because the origina-
tion of these payments was not contractually mandated ... The pay-
ments were 'incidental and inconsequential' because Germany would
have accepted the payments from any location."115 Thus, the finan-
cial loss the plaintiff suffered in the United States for events occur-
ring entirely in a foreign state was merely fortuitous and therefore
"insufficient to provide jurisdiction."1 1 6
* Potential Financial Losses from Notes Issued in the United States to
an Overseas Entity - No Direct Effect: In Fir Tree Capital Opportu-
nity Master Fund, LP, discussed supra, when the state-owned bank
began liquidating assets, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin further
sales.117 The district court acknowledged that when a foreign entity
breaches an obligation to make a payment in the United States, such
a breach may be a "legally significant act" with a "direct effect" in
the United States.118 But in this case, although the bank's obliga-
tions to the plaintiffs were "payable" in the United States, the plain-
tiffs alleged only a risk of non-payment, and jurisdiction under the
"direct effects" clause may not be based on acts that cause "only
speculative, generalized, immeasurable, and ultimately unverifiable
effects in the United States."119 Moreover, even if some concrete
injury could be discerned, the court found that the "effects" of the
bank's action would be felt in the Cayman Islands-where the plain-
tiffs were based-not in the United States.12 0
* Loss to U.S. Shareholder Resulting from Conduct Abroad - No Di-
rect Effect: Updating a case from our 2010 review, in Gosain v. State
Bank of India, the plaintiff, a U.S. national who was the majority
shareholder in an Indian company, sued the State Bank of India for
fraud arising from the bank's liquidation auction. 1 21 In the district
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id. at *6.
117. Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP v. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., No. 11
Civ. 0955(PPG), 2011 WL 6187077, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2011).
118. Id. at * 19.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Gosain v. State Bank of India, 414 F. App'x 311, 312 (2d Cir. 2011).
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court, the plaintiff had argued that his losses as a shareholder suf-
fered in the United States were a direct effect of the Bank's commer-
cial activity in India.122 The district court disagreed, reaffirming that
mere financial loss felt in the United States is insufficient to satisfy
the "direct effect" prong of the commercial activity exception. The
district court focused on evidence demonstrating that any proceeds
of the sale of plaintiff's shares were to be deposited first in an Indian
bank account and only then remitted to the plaintiff's U.S. bank ac-
count upon compliance with Indian regulations. Thus, the immedi-
ate (or direct) consequence of the alleged fraud was financial loss
suffered by the plaintiff in India, and any corresponding loss in the
United States would be an indirect effect of the bank's actions. 123
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that "the mere fact
that a foreign state's commercial activity outside of the United States
caused physical or financial injury to a United States citizen is not
itself sufficient to constitute a direct effect in the United States." 124
"[A] financial loss to an individual in the United States is insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to satisfy the direct effect requirement of the
[FSIA's commercial activities exception]." 12 5
C. TAKINGS - SECTION 16 0 5 (A)(3)
The FSIA provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or in-
strumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.126
In 2011, federal courts addressed several cases in which plaintiffs alleged
that the sovereign defendant should be subject to jurisdiction based on
the takings, or expropriation, exception to FSIA.
Plaintiff Must Allege a Taking. In Community Finance Group, Inc. v.
Republic of Kenya, the plaintiffs attempted to purchase gold in Kenya.127
As part of the transaction, the plaintiffs deposited $350,000 into a holding
company's account to cover taxes, customs, fees, and storage associated
with the planned purchase of Kenyan gold. The Kenyan Central Bank
122. Gosain v. State Bank of India, 689 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
123. Id. at 581.
124. 414 F. App'x at 313 (quoting Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69,
78 (2d Cir. 2010)).
125. Id.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2008).
127. See Cmty. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Republic of Kenya, 663 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 2011).
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verified the $350,000 transaction. Shortly thereafter, a Kenyan customs
officer informed plaintiffs that a United Nations permit was necessary
before the gold could be exported. Two individuals claiming to be with
the Nairobi United Nations office then told plaintiffs that the gold plain-
tiffs were purchasing came from a consignment confiscated by Kenyan
customs officials. The plaintiffs became suspicious and contacted Kenyan
authorities. Kenyan police arrested the individual who the plaintiffs had
been working with in Kenya to secure the gold, and then escorted plain-
tiffs' representatives to the customs office at Kenyatta International Air-
port. There, Kenyan police informed plaintiffs' representatives that the
gold had been removed from the airport and was being stored at the Ke-
nya Central Bank. None of plaintiffs' $350,000 was ever returned, and
plaintiffs never received any gold.
Following these events, the plaintiffs sued the Republic of Kenya, its
governmental agencies, and its central bank, alleging that the defendants
"improperly retained" plaintiffs' money and the gold plaintiffs intended
to buy by failing to protect the funds or otherwise make restitution out of
funds seized from the individual who had defrauded them. 128 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' claim, finding that the plaintiffs
"never paid for or acquired the gold that they allege[d] was taken from
them" and that they never alleged that money they had deposited with
the holding company for the gold was transferred to the defendants. 129
Thus, because the plaintiffs never owned or possessed the gold, it could
not be taken by the defendants.130 The court added that "[e]ven if such
property had been taken by defendants, [plaintiffs] still failed to establish
that the property is present in the United States or that the expropriating
defendants engage in commercial activity in the United States" as re-
quired by section 1605(a)(3).131
Taking Must Be Performed by the Sovereign. In Orkin v. Swiss Con-
federation, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's suit
against defendants Swiss Confederation and its agencies. 132 The plaintiff
alleged that, to pay for his family's escape from Nazi Germany, his great-
grandmother sold valuable artwork to an art collector at an artificially
low price who subsequently bequeathed the painting to the Swiss govern-
ment.133 The district court found that the takings exception did not apply
because the exception applies "only where the property at issue passed in
the first instance from the plaintiff-or . . . plaintiff's predecessor-to a
sovereign or to some person or entity acting on a sovereign's behalf."134
The district court recognized that other courts have upheld suits against
128. See id. at 979-81.
129. Id. at 981.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 444 F.App'x 469 (2d Cir. 2011).
133. Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 770 F. Supp. 2d 612, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 444 F.
App'x 469 (2d. Cir. 2011).
134. Id. at 616.
2013] 157
158 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
sovereigns who were not responsible for the original expropriation but
noted that even in those cases, the original taking was by a sovereign
entity.135 Because the "taking" in this case was by a private individual,
the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed.136
Contractual Right to Receive Payment Is Not "Property" Subject to
the Takings Exception. In Fagan v. Republic of Austria, 37 the plaintiff-
an attorney who represented Austrian victims in a mass tort action-sued
defendants Republic of Austria and its agencies for attorneys' fees arising
from the underlying tort action.138 The plaintiff argued that the Takings
Exception applied because the Austrian government interfered with his
right to receive attorney's fees.139 The district court refused to exercise
jurisdiction. As the court held, for purposes of the Takings Exception,
"the 'property taken . . . means physical property [and] not the right to
receive payment,"' as is the case in a claim for attorney's fees.140
Taking from De Facto Non-Citizens Violates International Law. In de
Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, the plaintiffs-a Jewish Hungarian art col-
lector and her descendants-alleged that defendant Republic of Hungary
and its agencies cooperated with Nazi Germany to seize artwork that is
now housed in a state-owned museum.141 The defendants argued that a
government's taking of its own citizens' property does not violate interna-
tional law.142 Evidence showed that a central plaintiff "considered her-
self to be a Hungarian citizen in 1944."143 But, the court found that
under the "extraordinary facts" of this case, "the government of Hun-
gary . . . had de facto stripped . . . all Hungarian Jews of their citizenship
rights," and for that reason could not avoid scrutiny under the FSIA.144
The defendants also argued that the complaint did not allege a suffi-
cient "commercial activity nexus" to the United States. 145 This require-
ment derives from the text of section 1605(a)(3): the "taken" property
must be either: (1) "present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,"
or (2) "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activ-
135. Orkin, 444 F. App'x at 471; cf. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1032
(9th Cir. 2010) ("[W]e conclude that § 1605(a)(3) does not require that the foreign
state against whom suit is brought be the foreign state that took the property at
issue in violation of international law.").
136. Orkin, 444 F. App'x at 470-71.
137. Fagan v. Republic of Austria, No. 08 CIV. 6715, 2011 WL 1197677 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
25, 2011).
138. See id. at *3.
139. See id. at *10.
140. Id. at *8 (quoting Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736,
749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
141. See De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2011).
142. Id. at 129.
143. Id. at 130.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 131.
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ity in the United States."1 46 Under the second prong of this "nexus" re-
quirement, the plaintiffs alleged that the state-run museum "engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States" by exchanging art with Ameri-
can museums, selling reproductions of the taken art to Americans both
online and at the museum gift shop, and encouraging American tourists
to visit the museum.147 The court found these allegations "more than
sufficient to amount to 'commercial activity"' for purposes of surviving a
motion to dismiss. 148
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS - SECTION 1605(A)(5)
The "non-commercial tort" or "tortious activity" exception subjects a
sovereign defendant to jurisdiction in the United States for claims based
on actions:
[I]n which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment . . .149
The Act, however, specifically removes two areas of liability from the
exception to immunity. First, the exception does not apply where the
claim is based on the exercise or performance (or failure to perform) of a
"discretionary function."150 Second, the exception does not apply to
claims arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contractual rights.151
In 2011, there were two developments relating to the non-commercial
torts exception. First, the Second Circuit addressed the question of
whether the terrorism exception contained in 28 U.S.C. section 1605A
(discussed more fully infra) provides the exclusive basis for jurisdiction
over terrorist acts by foreign states, thereby taking such cases out of the
realm of the non-commercial tort exception. Second, Congress re-intro-
duced a bill to amend the terrorism exception specifically to encompass
terrorist activity on U.S. soil. Aside from these new developments, 2011
saw several cases in which courts dismissed suits under the non-commer-
cial tort exception because the tort did not occur in or entirely in the
United States.152
Scope of Jurisdiction Over Terrorist Acts Under the Non-Commercial
Tort Exception. In Doe v. Bin Laden, the Second Circuit held that the
terrorism exception is not the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over terror-
ist acts by foreign states, and that the non-commercial tort exception pro-
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006).
147. De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 131 (D.D.C. 2011).




152. See, e.g., Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 777 F. Supp. 2d 6,25 (D.D.C. 2011); Cmty. Fin.
Grp., Inc. v. Republic of Kenya, 663 F.3d 977, 977 (8th Cir. 2011).
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vides jurisdiction over injuries that the terrorism exception does not
cover, e.g., where the foreign state has not been designated by the United
States as a state sponsor of terrorism. 53 In 2008, in the case In re Terror-
ist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the Second Circuit had dismissed
claims by victims of the September 11, 2001, attacks against the Saudi
Arabian Government under the FSIA's tort exception on the ground that
the terrorism exception provided the exclusive basis for any "claims
based on terrorism." 154 The terrorism exception was not applicable be-
cause Saudi Arabia had not been designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
In Doe v. Bin Laden, victims of the September 11 attacks brought claims
against the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, alleging a civil con-
spiracy with the Taliban and the Republic of Iraq to carry out the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks.'55 Afghanistan, like Saudi Arabia, was not
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. The trial court, while not di-
rectly addressing whether the terrorism exception is the exclusive basis
for terrorism-related claims, held that the suit against Afghanistan was
properly cognizable under the non-commercial tort exception. Afghani-
stan appealed from the decision. The question before the Second Circuit
was "whether the noncommercial tort exception [could] be a basis for a
suit arising from the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001."156
Afghanistan argued that the terrorism exception was designed to limit
those cases that may be covered by the non-commercial tort exception.
The Second Circuit discussed several reasons for rejecting that reading.
First, the court said that such a reading would have to rest on the pre-
mise that "there exists no set of cases covered by the terrorism exception
that fall outside the noncommercial tort exception."157 But, such a pre-
mise is demonstrably false because the noncommercial tort exception ap-
plies to injuries or damages occurring in the United States, and the
paradigmatic wrong the terrorism exception was intended to cover are
terrorist acts injuring or killing U.S. nationals abroad. Second, the court
reasoned that Afghanistan's narrow reading of the non-commercial tort
exception would amount to a partial repeal of the non-commercial tort
exception. Prior to enactment of the terrorism exception, courts had al-
lowed claims against foreign governments under the non-commercial tort
exception for arguably terrorist acts occurring in the United States. Con-
gress is presumed to have been aware of this interpretation of the non-
commercial tort exception when it enacted the terrorism exception.
Third, under Afghanistan's reading, "the enactment of the terrorism ex-
ception would represent a contraction rather than an expansion of juris-
diction over foreign states," 58 and the legislative history of the terrorism
exception suggests a contrary intent. Finally, the court held that the stat-
153. See Doe. v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011).
154. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir. 2008).
155. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d at 65.
156. Id. at 66.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Id. at 69.
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ute alleviates any concern regarding overlapping exceptions by expressly
limiting the terrorism exception to cases "not otherwise covered by [the
FSIA]."' 59 Thus, "the terrorism exception, far from limiting the preexist-
ing noncommercial tort exception, is there to cover some injuries that the
noncommercial tort exception does not reach."160
Re-introduction of Proposed Amendment Encompassing Terrorism.
In 2011, ten days after the Second Circuit's decision in Doe v. Bin Laden,
Senator Schumer re-introduced the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism
Act,161 legislation which, like its predecessor bill, would allow victims of
terrorism to sue foreign states for damages resulting from attacks on U.S.
soil. Unlike the terrorism exception, the defendant sovereign need not be
on the U.S. Department of State's state-sponsor-of-terrorism list. Rather,
this proposed legislation would provide that any country that provides
material support for a terrorist attack on U.S. soil would be stripped of
immunity and subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 162 The current bill
differs from its predecessor in that it would not apply retroactively to
dismissed actions.163 But, it would apply to all proceedings pending on
the date of enactment or commenced thereafter.164
Finally, the proposed amendment would remove the requirement from
section 1605(a)(5) (the non-commercial tort exception), as currently in-
terpreted by the courts, that the tortious act or omission occur in the
United States. While the bill's stated purpose is to provide the fullest
possible basis on which civil litigants can seek relief against foreign orga-
nizations that engage in terrorist activities against the United States,165
this statutory language could sweep in a broad array of activities that
would otherwise be excluded from section 1605(a)(5). In 2011 alone,
there were five decisions in which courts refused to find against foreign
sovereigns for liability under the non-commercial torts exception because
the tortious act did not occur in the United States.
E. ARBITRATION - SECTION 1605(A)(6)
Under the FSIA, U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
an agreement to arbitrate or to confirm an arbitration award if (1) the
arbitration took place or is intended to take place in the United States,
(2) "the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the rec-
ognition and enforcement of arbitral awards," or (3) but for the agree-
159. Id. at 70.
160. Id.
161. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 1894, 112th Cong. (2011). Little ac-
tion has been taken on the bill since its introduction and, as of the date of this
publication, it is still pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Bill Sum-
mary & Status: 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) S. 1894, Library of Congress, http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.01894: (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
162. Id. at § 2(b).
163. Id. § 7(c).
164. Id. §§ 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6(b), 7(b).
165. Id. at § 2(b).
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ment to arbitrate, the underlying claim could have been brought in a U.S.
court under the FSIA.166 Cases are frequently brought under the second
option, but plaintiffs' failure to satisfy other jurisdictional requirements
(statutory or constitutional) can prove fatal to their claims.
A related question that courts frequently address under the FSIA's ar-
bitration exception is whether the party against whom enforcement of an
arbitral award is sought is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state. 16 7 In GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Authority, the plaintiff peti-
tioned the district court to confirm a foreign arbitration award against the
National Port Authority, a public corporation registered under the laws of
the Republic of Liberia.168 The court found that the defendant, a Libe-
rian government-owned corporation, was not an instrumentality of the
Liberian government because it operated independently from the govern-
ment.169 Consequently, the court found that the defendant was similar to
a private foreign entity that was entitled to due process rights (not af-
forded to foreign sovereigns) and could not be subject to suit in a U.S.
court without sufficient minimum contacts, something the plaintiff had
not alleged.o70 So while the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute under the FSIA arbitration exception, it did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The court thus dismissed the plaintiff's
petition for confirmation of the arbitration award.
In another arbitration case, Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, the
arbitration judgment holders sought to modify confirmation of an arbitra-
tion award.171 The petitioners were Dutch nationals who had invest-
ments in commercial farms in Zimbabwe. Because of the Zimbabwe
government's actions over a number of years, the petitioners lost their
investments. In response, the petitioners commenced an arbitration pro-
ceeding against the government of Zimbabwe, and eventually received an
award against Zimbabwe based on a bilateral investment treaty between
Zimbabwe and the Netherlands. The petitioners sought to add as judg-
ment debtors several entities affiliated with Zimbabwe's government so
that they could attempt to collect the arbitration award from these
entities.
The district court found that because Zimbabwe, the Netherlands, and
the United States were signatories to the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes, and the petitioners' arbitration award was ob-
tained under that treaty, the court had subject matter jurisdiction under
the FSIA's arbitration exception.172 But the court avoided the question
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2006).
167. See supra Section II.A (discussing entities that qualify as a foreign state or agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state).
168. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2011).
169. Id. at 138-39.
170. Id. at 139-41.
171. Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, No. 09 Civ. 8168, 2011 WL 666227, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011).
172. Id. at *2.
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of whether the defendants were "instrumentalities" under the FSIA be-
cause the plaintiffs had failed to identify specific property located in the
United States used for a commercial activity and had failed to serve de-
fendants properly under section 1608 of the FSIA, thereby failing to es-
tablish personal jurisdiction.17 3 Consequently, the court denied the
petitioners' motion to add defendants to the arbitration award.174
F. TERRORISM - SECTION 1605A AND SECTION 1605(A)(7)
In 2011, courts continued to address the amendments to the "terrorism
exception" to the FSIA, which were enacted in 2008 as part of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA).s75 The
amendments replaced section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA with the new "ter-
rorism exception," codified at section 1605A. Under both section
1605(a)(7) and section 1605A, foreign states designated by the U.S. De-
partment of State as state sponsors of terrorism (and their agencies and
instrumentalities) are stripped of sovereign immunity for certain terrorist
acts as long as the state is designated as a "state sponsor of terrorism"
either at the time of the terrorist act or at some later time as a result of
the act that is the subject of the suit.17 6 For defendants' conduct to fall
within this exception, they must have participated in an "act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking" or provided
"material support or resources for such an act."177 Plaintiffs must also
prove causation and damages.178 Among the most significant recent
changes to the "terrorism exception," the statute now expressly (a) pro-
vides plaintiffs with a federal statutory cause of action against state spon-
sors of terrorism, 7 9 and (b) allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages.180
1. Implementation of Section 1605A
Mechanics. Section 1605A does not apply automatically to claims
pending before courts under section 1605(a)(7).81 Rather, claims pend-
ing under section 1605(a)(7) could be "converted" to section 1605A
claims, or "given effect" of such claims, if they were re-filed within sixty
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id.
175. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,122
Stat. 3.
176. Currently, that list consists of Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. State Sponsors of
Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T oi. STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl415l.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2013). Countries that were once on the list but have since been re-
moved include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, South Yemen, and Libya.




181. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2008) rev'd sub nom.
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009) vacated, 330 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F. Supp. 2d 79, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2009).
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days of the enactment of section 1605A.182 Plaintiffs also could have filed
"new" claims that were "related" to a prior action-i.e., arose from the
same act or incident-that was timely brought under section 1605(a)(7),
so long as the related action was filed within sixty days of the enactment
of section 1605A or of the judgment in the prior action.' 83
Evidentiary Burden. In properly filed related actions, courts in 2011
continued to rely upon evidence presented in earlier cases-without re-
quiring the parties to reproduce such evidence-to reach their own, inde-
pendent findings of fact. 184 In Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
district court found Iran responsible for the 1983 attacks on the Marine
barracks in Lebanon, but relied on evidence presented in prior actions
involving the same incident without requiring plaintiffs to re-establish
Iran's liability.' 85
2. Claims by Foreign Nationals
One of the most significant aspects of section 1605A was its expansion
of the "terrorism exception" to provide a cause of action to certain vic-
tims and family members who are foreign nationals. This new federal
cause of action is available to: (1) U.S. nationals, (2) members of the
armed forces, (3) U.S. government employees, and (4) legal representa-
tives of the individuals in the first three categories.186 In addressing
claims of foreign national victims for the first time, courts also permitted
the claims of those victims' foreign national family members to proceed,
finding that although section 1605A's plain language limits the federal
cause of action to its four stated categories, it operates as a pass-through
for foreign national family members to claims under applicable state or
foreign law.'87
3. Choice of Law Issues
One of Congress's motivations in creating a federal cause of action was
to eliminate the disparate outcomes that had resulted from the applica-
tion of different state and foreign laws to plaintiffs in the same case based
on their domiciles at the time of the incident.188 Nonetheless, in certain
182. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181
§ 1083(c)(2), 122 Stat 3 (2008).
183. See id.; Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2011)
(citing § 1083(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
184. See Taylor, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
185. See id. at 14-16 (citing Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52
(D.D.C. 2010); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C.
2003)).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (2006).
187. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 152-53 (D.D.C. 2011); Estate of
Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2011).
188. Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 72 (D.D.C.
2011); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 811 F. Supp. 2d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2011).
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circumstances, courts still must navigate through difficult choice of law
principles in applying the terrorism exception.
Claims of Foreign National Family Members Under Section 1605A.
Because a federal cause of action pursuant to section 1605A is available
only to the categories of individuals explicitly identified therein, courts
must determine which state or foreign law applies to the claims of foreign
national family members of victims of terrorism.189 In light of the
NDAA's purpose of promoting uniformity, the courts conducting this
analysis typically have applied D.C. law, the law of the forum, to all such
claims where the attacks were targeted at U.S. interests. 190
1605(a)(7) Claims. In 2011, despite the passage of section 1605A,
courts still had to address choice of law issues in section 1605(a)(7) cases.
In Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the district court reaf-
firmed its previous finding that Israeli law applied to the claims of a U.S.
national who was murdered in 1997 by a suicide bomber at a pedestrian
mall in Jerusalem.191 The court reasoned that the victim was domiciled in
Israel and that there was no evidence the attack, which was intended to
disrupt Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, was targeted at U.S. citi-
zens or interests.' 9 2 The court then found that Israeli law did not permit
the plaintiff to proceed with claims for assault, wrongful death, or mental
injury.' 93
Other Choice of Law Issues Under Section 1605A. Even section
1605A's federal cause of action may still involve choice of law analyses in
addressing certain issues, such as whether estates can recover for emo-
tional and mental anguish suffered while the decedent was still alive.194
The court in Taylor applied the laws of four different states to find that
four plaintiff-estates had standing to bring such claims.195
3. Rulings by Appellate Courts on the Bounds of Section 1605A
Noncommercial Tort Exception. As discussed above, the Second Cir-
cuit in Doe v. Bin Laden held that Afghanistan, which is not a designated
state sponsor of terrorism, could be sued under the noncommercial tort
exception for its role in the September 11, 2001 attacks.' 9 6 The court held
section 1605A does not provide the exclusive basis for terrorism-related
suits, but rather was intended to fill a gap where other exceptions do
not.197
189. See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 153-57; Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20-23.
190. Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 153-56 (Sudanese and Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998); Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20-23 (Iranian-
sponsored attacks on U.S. embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984).
191. See Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.D.C.
2011).
192. Id. at 225-26.
193. Id. at 229-32.
194. Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12.
195. Id. at 12-13.
196. See Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011).
197. Id. at 70.
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Algiers Accords. The D.C. Circuit held that the NDAA does not go so
far as to allow claims against Iran for its taking of hostages in 1979.198
The court held that the NDAA did not abrogate the Algiers Accords-
the 1981 agreement between the U.S. and Iran that secured the hostages'
release and contained express prohibitions barring lawsuits arising out of
the hostage taking. 199 The court reasoned that to abrogate an interna-
tional agreement, the legislation must have been unambiguous, and the
NDAA was not on this point, and that a fair reading of the provision was
that it only allowed cases that were still pending at the time of the 2008
amendments, and the plaintiff's case had been dismissed.200
G. DAMAGES
2011 witnessed several significant damage awards levied against state
sponsors of terrorism-in particular, against Iran, which "continues to be
the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism."201 Damage awards in
FSIA cases continue generally to apply benchmark awards developed
under section 1605(a)(7) for certain types of injuries and circumstances.
A more recent challenge for courts has been the measure of punitive
damages, which are explicitly allowed under section 1605A.
Economic Damages. Reasonably foreseeable economic damages have
been awarded under the terrorism exception for, among other things, loss
of earning capacity and property. In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the district
court awarded property damages to underwriters of the insurance policy
on an EgyptAir aircraft destroyed in a 1985 attack sponsored by Syria. 202
In a companion case, the court relied on expert testimony to award eco-
nomic damages based on the victims' loss of earning capacity.203 Simi-
larly, in Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the same court awarded
economic damages for lost wages resulting from injuries suffered in the
1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon and for loss of
accretions to the estate resulting from wrongful death of decedents in the
attack.204 However, in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court re-
fused to award damages for loss of inheritance to the grandson of an as-
sassinated former Iranian general, because the proximate cause of the
loss of assets was the 1979 revolution and his grandfather's flight from
Iran, not his murder in Paris in 1984.205
198. See Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 646 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 61-62.
201. Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic, 08 C 1939, 2011 WL 444762, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2011) rev'd sub nom. Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561
(7th Cir. 2012).
202. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 811 F. Supp. 2d 53, 74-75 (D.C.C. 2011).
203. Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 72 (D.D.C.
2011).
204. Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 (D.D.C. 2011).
205. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30-33 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Victims' Pain and Suffering. Survivors of terrorist attacks have been
deemed entitled to baseline awards of $5 million in compensatory dam-
ages for substantial injuries. 206 Courts have departed upward to award
damages as high as $15 million in cases of more severe, permanent inju-
ries,207 and downward to as low as $1.5 million where the injuries are
minor or purely emotional.208 Courts have "rather uniformly" awarded
$1 million to estates of victims who endured extreme pain and suffering
for a period of hours prior to their deaths.209
Solatium. In assessing loss of solatium awards for victims' family mem-
bers, courts have analyzed the following factors: (1) whether the victim
died in the attack, (2) the nature of the relationship between the claimant
and the victim, and (3) the severity and duration of the pain suffered by
the family member.210 Courts have generally awarded baseline awards of
$8 million, $5 million, and $2.5 million for spouses, parents, and siblings
of deceased servicemen respectively; and have cut these amounts in half
for family members of surviving victims who were injured.211 Plaintiffs
must have been immediate family members of the victims at the time of
the attack to receive awards for loss of solatium. 212 But, courts have ap-
plied the $5 million baseline for de facto parent-child relationships. 213
Decisions to depart upward from these baselines "are largely derived
from common sense, and generally fall into one of three categories: evi-
dence establishing an especially close relationship between the plaintiff
and decedent . . . medical proof of severe pain, grief or suffering on be-
half of the claimant; and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack
which made the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing." 214 The
Oveissi court departed upward to an award of $7.5 million because of a
particularly close parent-child relationship, the sudden and unexpected
nature of the murder, the plaintiff's inability to grieve because he lived
under the threat of a further attack, and the plaintiff's life-altering feeling
of permanent loss. 2 15 Other upward departures included when a plaintiff
endured the deaths of multiple family members and suffered other
206. See Bland, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 155; Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Leibovitch v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 08 C 1939, 2011 WL 444762, at *9 (N.D. 1Il. Feb. 1, 2011)
rev'd sub nom. Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2012).
207. See Leibovitch, 2011 WL 444762, at *9; Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Bland, 831 F.
Supp. 2d at 154-55.
208. See Bland, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56.
209. Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82.
210. Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26.
211. Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, (D.D.C.
2011); Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 26, n.10; Bland, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 156; see also
Leibovitch, 2011 WL 444762, at *10.
212. See Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 75-76 (dismissing solatium claims of husband married
to victim 11 years after attack and son born 12 years after attack); Bland, 831 F.
Supp. 2d at 157.
213. See Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (finding child-parent relationship between plain-
tiff and victim-grandfather).
214. Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27; Bland, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (quoting Oveissi,
768 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27).
215. Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 27-30.
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strained relationships, 216 and for claimants who were "hit particularly
hard" by the murder of their sibling.2 17 Downward departures included
circumstances involving a former spouse,218 and for family members of
victims who did not suffer physical injuries. 219
Punitive Damages. Unlike section 1605(a)(7), section 1605A explicitly
allows for punitive damages.220 To avail themselves of this provision
some plaintiffs have brought related actions for punitive damages under
section 1083(c)(3) after they already obtained judgments for compensa-
tory damages under section 1605(a)(7). 221 Other plaintiffs in related ac-
tions have requested punitive damages as a separate count. Courts have
dismissed these counts for failure to state a cause of action, but have read
the requests for punitive damages into the proper counts.222
In determining the amount of punitive damage awards, courts evaluate:
(1) the character of the defendants' acts, (2) the nature and extent of the
harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to cause, (3)
the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of defendants. 223 Applying
these factors, some courts have applied a three-to-five time multiple of
the state's estimated annual funds used to support terrorism. 2 2 4
In Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the district court rejected the argu-
ment that this method did not comport with due process concerns regard-
ing punitive damages, as expressed most recently by the Supreme Court
in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.225 The court reasoned that: (1) federal
due process protections do not apply to foreign states, 226 (2) Exxon was
limited to the context of maritime law,2 2 7 (3) Congress was aware of the
Supreme Court's concerns when it chose language specifically indicating
its intention to allow this method,228 and (4) FSIA cases involve unique
policy considerations because "[t]errorism, along with atrocities such as
genocide, occupies a unique place in the pantheon of human conduct as
an activity devoid of value that observes no respect for life and no hint of
compassion." 2 2 9
But in Leibovitch v. Syrian Republic,230 the district court deviated from
216. Leibovitch, 2011 WL 444762, at *10.
217. Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 83-84.
218. Id. at 84.
219. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 49 (D.D.C. 2012).
220. See 28 U.S. C. § 1605A(e)(1) (2006).
221. See Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 789 F. Supp. 2d 14, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2011);
Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2011).
222. See Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2011).
223. Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 13; Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 84-85.
224. See Beer, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 26; Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14.
225. Beer, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471
(2008)).
226. Id. at 20-22.
227. Id. at 22-23.
228. Id. at 23-25.
229. Id. at 25.
230. Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 08 C 1939, 2011 WL 444762 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2011), rev'd sub nom. Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561
(7th Cir. 2012).
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the three-to-five times multiplier in part because of Exxon.231 The court
noted that a high punitive damage award in that case would not signifi-
cantly add to the deterrent effect of the numerous other such awards al-
ready assessed against Iran.2 32 The court thus doubled compensatory
damages to arrive at its punitive damage award. 233 Other courts similarly
have balanced the Supreme Court's concerns against the need to deter
state sponsors of terrorism by applying a ratio of 3.44 to compensatory
damages.234
Still other courts have applied a "per-victim" standard based on awards
in similar terrorism cases. The court in Baker limited punitive damages
awards against Syria to $450 million in light of other awards based on the
same incident, where multiplying the annual terrorism expenditures by
three would have resulted in an award of $1.8 billion.2 3 5
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
Even if a plaintiff overcomes a foreign state's immunity and obtains a
judgment, it may find it difficult to enforce the judgment. The FSIA pro-
tects a foreign state's property in the United States by granting broad
immunity from attachment and judgment execution. 236 For example, a
foreign state's military property is always immune from attachment. 237
But there are exceptions to the FSIA's protection of a foreign state's
property. 238 For example, the FSIA authorizes a judgment creditor to
execute on the judgment, or attach in aid of such execution, property of a
foreign sovereign if the following conditions are met: (1) the property is
used for a commercial activity in the United States, (2) a reasonable
amount of time has passed since a court entered the judgment against the
foreign state, and (3) the property otherwise satisfies the requirements of
one of the exceptions to immunity in section 1610.239 Moreover, pre-
judgment attachments are permitted in certain limited circumstances,
where the foreign state has expressly waived its attachment immunity
prior to judgment, and the purpose of the attachment is solely to secure
satisfaction of a judgment that may be entered later against the foreign
state (and not to obtain jurisdiction over the sovereign). 240 Additionally,
the filing of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1605A against a
state sponsor of terrorism may operate to establish a lien of lis pendens
231. Id. at *10.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Estate of Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C.
2011) (resulting in punitive damages award of $955,652.324).
235. Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 85-86
(D.D.C. 2011).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2006).
237. Id. § 1611(b)(2).
238. See id. § 1610.
239. Id. § 1610(a)-(c).
240. Id. § 1610(d).
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upon certain real or tangible property subject to attachment. 241
A. THE COMMERCIAL AcTiviTy EXCEPTION TO
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT
Section 1610 of the FSIA creates an exception to immunity from at-
tachment and execution for a foreign state's property when that property
is used for commercial activity in the United States and it "was used for
the commercial activity upon which the claim is based." 242 At first
glance, this commercial activity exception for attachment and execution
appears similar to the FSIA's general "commercial activity" exception to
immunity from suit.2 4 3 In practice, however, the exception for attach-
ment and execution is narrower than the exception for jurisdiction.244 As
a result, plaintiffs may find it difficult to establish that a foreign state's
commercial activity in the United States makes its property exempt from
immunity, even if that same commercial activity subjected the foreign
state to jurisdiction in a U.S. court.245
According to the Ninth Circuit, for property to be "used for commer-
cial activity" under FSIA section 1610, the foreign state's property must
be "put into action ... or employed for a commercial activity." 2 4 6 Merely
employing the property "in connection with a commercial activity or in
relation to a commercial activity" is not enough.247 This subtle distinction
was recently the subject of a case involving the property of a foreign
state's space agency. In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Spaceport Systems Interna-
tional, the plaintiff hoped to enforce a judgment against Argentina by
attaching a satellite developed by Argentina's national space agency,
CONAE, in cooperation with NASA. 24 8 The district court held that the
plaintiff failed to show that the satellite fell within the commercial activity
exception to immunity from attachment because the satellite was not be-
ing "used for a commercial activity" as required by section 1610(a) of the
FSIA.249 The plaintiff had argued that conducting research in space qual-
ified as a commercial activity, but since the satellite had not been
launched yet, the court found that it was not actively employed for that
commercial activity.250 The satellite's pre-launch tests and procedures
also did not constitute commercial activity under the FSIA because they
241. Id. § 1605A(g).
242. Id. § 1610(a)(2); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304
(S.D. Fla. 2011).
243. Compare § 1610(a)(2) with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
244. See Licea, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (noting that Congress deliberately chose to
make immunity from attachment and execution narrower than immunity from
jurisdiction).
245. See id.
246. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Spaceport Sys. Int'l, L.P., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (C.D.
Cal. 2011) (emphasis in original).
247. Id. (emphasis in original).
248. Id. at 1115.
249. Id. at 1120.
250. Id. at 1121.
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had only "a passing connection to commerce." 251 Finally, the court ob-
served that even if the satellite were to be launched, it would not be sub-
ject to attachment because Argentina's relationships with NASA and
other space agencies were in no way commercial. 252 Argentina planned
to use the satellite for "a mission of 'international cooperation' exclu-
sively amongst governmental bodies," and therefore the satellite did not
fall under the exception to attachment immunity under the FSIA. 2 5 3
B. ENFORCING AWARDS AGAINST A FOREIGN CENTRAL BANK
The FSIA expressly preserves the immunity accorded certain sovereign
assets from attachment. In addition to, e.g., military property, the FSIA,
28 U.S.C. 1611, makes clear that a foreign central bank's property is gen-
erally immune from attachment and execution if it is held for the bank's
own account. This immunity applies even if the property otherwise
would fall into an exception to immunity under section 1610.254 Pursuant
to section 1611, only an explicit waiver by the central bank or its parent
foreign government can subject the central bank's property to attachment
and execution. 255
In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina,256
the subject of the dispute was a bank account held by the Central Bank of
Argentina at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Central Bank
used the account in New York to manage its "dollar-denominated reserve
holdings." 257 In 2005, beneficial owners of debt instruments on which
Argentina had defaulted in 2001 moved to attach the funds in the Central
Bank's Federal Reserve Bank account in New York to satisfy their judg-
ments against Argentina.258 Under section 1611 of the FSIA, these funds
would be immune from attachment if they were held for the Central
Bank's own account. The district court concluded that Argentina com-
pletely controlled the Central Bank and disregarded the formal separa-
tion between the Republic of Argentina and the Central Bank. 25 9
Accordingly, the court held that the funds in the Central Bank's New
York account at the time the action was brought in 2005 were effectively
the Republic of Argentina's funds and no longer held for the Central
Bank's "own account," and therefore section 1611's general immunity
from attachment of central bank property did not apply.2 6 0 The district
court then looked at section 1610 and held that the Argentina had used
the Central Bank's account in New York for typical private banking activ-
251. Id. at 1122.
252. Id. at 1124.
253. Id.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2006).
255. Id.
256. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la Republica Arg., 652 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir.
2011).
257. Id. at 177.
258. Id. at 178.
259. Id. at 182-83.
260. Id.
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ity.2 6 1 In other words, Argentina had engaged in commercial activity in
the United States, and the district court allowed the plaintiffs to attach
the Central Bank's funds in the New York account.262 Argentina and the
Central Bank appealed. 263
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion
that Argentina's total control over the Central Bank exempted the bank's
funds from immunity.264 The court emphasized that foreign central
banks are not "generic agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state"
because they receive special protections under the FSIA. 265 Section 1611
"immunizes foreign central bank property 'held for its own account' with-
out regard to the central bank's independence from its parent state."266
The level of control Argentina exerted over the Central Bank therefore
was irrelevant to the question of whether the Central Bank's property
was immune from attachment under the FSIA.
The Second Circuit then adopted "a modified central bank functions
test" to determine when central bank property is held for the bank's own
account.267 Under this test, funds are presumed immune from attach-
ment under section 1611 if they are held in an account with the central
bank's name.268 A plaintiff seeking attachment "can rebut that presump-
tion by demonstrating with specificity that the funds are not being used
for central banking functions as such functions are normally under-
stood."269 By managing its reserves and transferring funds to conform
with regulatory requirements, the Central Bank had engaged in central
banking functions, and so the funds in the New York account were
deemed held for the bank's own account.270 Finally, because there had
been no "clear and unambiguous" waiver of immunity, the court held
that the Central Bank's funds in the account were immune from
attachment.271
C. ENFORCEMENT IN TERRORISM CASES
A special exception to immunity from attachment applies when a judg-
ment holder seeks to attach property "as compensation for personal in-
jury or death resulting from an act of terrorism or the provision of
material support or resources for an act of terrorism." 272 But the FSIA
still respects "the independence and dignity of every foreign state"-even
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 186.
264. Id. at 190.
265. Id. at 188 (internal quotations omitted).
266. Id. at 190.
267. Id. at 194.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 195.
271. Id. at 195-96.
272. See Levin v. Bank of New York, No. 09-CV-5900, 2011 WL 812032, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 4, 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A(a)(1), 1610(a)-(b) (2006)).
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states found to be sponsors of terrorism. 273 As a result, even victims of
terrorism must follow the proper procedures for enforcing a judgment
against a foreign sovereign to ensure that the foreign state's rights are
respected under the FSIA.
Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran illustrates the point. There, the
plaintiffs held a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) under the state-
sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA.2 74 The plaintiffs asked the
court's permission to serve a copy of the judgment on Iran only and not
on MOIS, since they planned to execute the judgment only against
Iran.2 7 5 The court denied plaintiffs' request, noting that "entry of default
judgment against a foreign state or its instrumentalities must be accompa-
nied by service of that judgment" so that proper notice is provided to the
defaulting entities.2 7 6 The court went on to say that the FSIA does not
allow plaintiffs "to selectively choose those defendants upon which they
would serve and then seek enforcement." 2 7 7 The court noted that section
1610(c) of the FSIA does not state that a defendant's property is immune
from execution and attachment until that particular defendant is served
with the judgment against it; rather, the FSIA indicates that courts will
not permit any attachment or execution against any defendant's property
until all defendants are properly notified of the judgment against them.2 7 8
As a result, the court found that the plaintiffs' intent to serve Iran only
(because they planned to seek enforcement against only Iranian prop-
erty) would circumvent the purpose of the FSIA, 2 7 9 and refused to au-
thorize execution until all defendants had been "served with the final
judgment and given an opportunity to respond." 2 8 0
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION
In 2011, judicial decisions regarding the FSIA illustrated various proce-
dural issues that arise in cases brought against foreign sovereigns in such
areas as the Act of State doctrine, due process, service of process, juris-
dictional issues, venue, forum non conveniens, default judgments and in-
terlocutory appeals. A brief review of certain notable decisions follows.
A. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
"The act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed
273. Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 778 F. Supp. 2d 70, 71 (D.D.C. 2011).
274. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006).
275. Murphy, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
276. Id.
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within its own territory." 281 Pursuant to the act of state doctrine, "an
action may be barred if (1) there is an 'official act of a foreign sovereign
performed within its own territory,' and (2) 'the relief sought or the de-
fense interposed [in the action would require] a court in the United States
to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign's] official act.' "282 But courts are
not required to give deference to "purely commercial" acts.2 8 3 The for-
eign entity seeking to invoke the act of state "defense" has the burden to
establish its applicability. 284 Foreign sovereigns must also consider the
procedural posture of the action before attempting to invoke the act of
state doctrine, as courts may decline to address the issue at the pleadings
stage and wait until summary judgment.285
In de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, the district court considered
whether the taking of Jewish artifacts by Hungary implicated the act of
state doctrine. 286 The district court determined that the alleged theft was
commercial in nature, and that the appropriate foreign entity was not the
current sovereign nation of Hungary; rather, it was "Nazi Germany and
their allies in the World War II-era Hungarian government." 2 8 7 In this
situation, "courts have consistently held that the act of state doctrine does
not apply to the Nazi taking of Jewish property during the Holocaust,"
which is considered "manifestly illegal" and was supported by a govern-
ment that is no longer in existence.288
B. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process pursuant to the FSIA must comport with 28 U.S.C.
sections 1608(a) and (b), which detail the acceptable methods of service
on foreign states, political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. In
order to affect proper service on foreign states (or political subdivisions),
the summons and complaint must be transmitted pursuant to the follow-
ing methods enumerated in section 1608(a), in the following preferential
order:
(1) "in accordance with any special arrangement for service between
the plaintiff and the foreign state," (2) "in accordance with an appli-
cable international convention on service of judicial documents," (3)
281. Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP, 2011 WL 6187077, at *14 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1208 (9th Cir.
2007).
282. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 405 (1964)).
283. Id. at *14 (holding the act of state doctrine inapplicable where foreign banks acts
were "commercial rather than sovereign in nature").
284. Victims of Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State Rys., 798 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939
(N.D. Ill. 2011).
285. Id. ("[T]he act of state doctrine is properly characterized as a defense and thus is
not properly addressed at the pleadings stage since a plaintiff need not plead alle-
gations in anticipation of avoiding defenses."); Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (supporting the
same premise).
286. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2011).
287. Id. at 143.
288. Id. (citing Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 466 F.Supp.2d 6,14 (D.D.C. 2006)).
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"by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt . . . [from] the clerk
of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs," or (4) by
diplomatic channels through the State Department in Washington,
D.C.289
If a plaintiff is using the third or fourth forms of service, the statute
requires that the documents be sent along with translations into the offi-
cial language of the foreign state. 290
Strict compliance with this rule is essential to succeed in an action
under the FSIA. A cautionary tale is found in Bleier v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, where plaintiffs were "granted leave" by a previously as-
signed judge to serve the summons and complaint on Germany and the
Ministry of Finance by e-mailing the documents to the foreign entities'
counsel. 291 But in a motion to dismiss, Germany and the Ministry of Fi-
nance argued that the previous judge's decision on service should be re-
considered. The district court made clear that plaintiffs must follow the
service requirements under section 1608(a), and granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, noting that service by
email is not provided for under section 1608(a). 292
In another case, the D.C. Circuit found service effective despite a fac-
tual dispute. In Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, family members of victims
of a terrorist attack attempted to serve the initial pleadings on Syria, but
Syria claimed that the pleadings were never delivered by the mail carrier,
DHL.2 9 3 Counsel for the plaintiffs produced a letter from DHL together
with a copy of a delivery log reflecting that the package was tracked to
the right address and signed for upon receipt.2 9 4 Syria claimed the track-
ing documentation was fraudulent, but the district court determined that
Syria had been properly served. The appellate court found no clear error
in the district court's reliance upon the DHL letter, and service was
deemed effective.295
With respect to service on agencies or instrumentalities, one need not
follow the requirements of section 1608(b) as closely as with a foreign
state or political subdivision; 296 only "substantial compliance" with the
service rules is required. 297 Thus, some courts have allowed the case to
proceed based on "'technically faulty service' [under section 1608(b)], as
long as the defendants receive adequate notice of the suit and are not
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1-4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (sequential service of
process requirements also exist for service on agencies and instrumentalities of a
foreign state).
290. Id. § 1608(a)(3-4).
291. Bleier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, No. 08-C-06254, 2011 WL 4626164, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011).
292. Id.
293. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
294. Id.
295. Id. at *4-5.
296. See Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Doe I v.
State of Israel 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102 (D.D.C. 2005)).
297. Id. at 268.
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prejudiced." 2 98
C. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held that, for
purposes of the FSIA, "there is no issue of due process under the Fifth
Amendment, as 'foreign states are not "persons" protected by the Fifth
Amendment.'"299 Accordingly, foreign states typically may not invoke
lack of due process as a defense in FSIA litigation. The consequence for
a foreign state is that "'customary international law,' which may call for a
'minimum-contacts-like test' is inapplicable in these circumstances."3 00
Thus, after subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA has been estab-
lished and defendants are properly served pursuant to the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. section 1608, the court will retain personal jurisdiction over
the defendants.30'
But the inapplicability of due process protection to foreign states in
FSIA actions does not necessarily extend to foreign agencies or instru-
mentalities. In 2011, at least one court considered whether a public for-
eign entity-e.g., a corporation owned and operated by a foreign
government-could rely upon a due process argument to avoid personal
jurisdiction. In GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Authority (NPA), the
district court determined that a Liberian public corporation, which specif-
ically held itself out as "independent from its sovereign," was entitled to
due process protections while the Liberian government was not.3 0 2 In
298. Id. at 269.
299. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 811 F. Supp. 2d 53, 71-72 (D.C.C. 2011); see also Price v. Socialist Peo-
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see e.g., Frontera Res.
Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir.
2009); Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 77
(D.D.C. 2011); O'Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (W.D. Ky. 2007);
Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Rux v.
Republic of Sudan, No. Civ. A. 2:04CV428, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 26, 2005); Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
300. Lloyd's London, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 71-72; see also Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co.,
Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2011 WL 3516154, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011).
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b); See, e.g., Servaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, No. 10-828-CV,
2011 WL 665334, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2011); Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F.
Supp. 2d 128, 148 (D.D.C. 2011); Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp.
2d 1, 11 n. 4 (D.D.C. 2011); Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp.
2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2011); but cf Bleier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, No. 08 C
06254, 2011 WL 4626164, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding no personal juris-
diction over Germany or the Ministry of Finance where they were not properly
served under section 1608(a)); Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, No. 09 Civ.
8168, 2011 WL 666227, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (same holding applied to the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe); Seijas v. The Republic of Argentina, No. 10 Civ.
4300, 2011 WL 1137942, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs'
failure to establish foreign corporation as an alter ego of Argentina precluded the
finding of subject matter, and thus, personal jurisdiction); NML Capital, Ltd. v.
The Republic of Argentina, No. 09 Civ., 2011 WL524433 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011).
302. GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139 (D.D.C. 2011).
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other words, a public foreign entity run separate and independently from
its sovereign is entitled to the same due process protections as a private
foreign entity that is subject to personal jurisdiction in United States
courts. 3 0 3 Finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign en-
tity, the court observed:
Such a corporation, unlike a foreign sovereign, is not the "juridical
equal[ ]" of the United States. It presumably has no diplomatic pres-
ence or political authority with which to engage the United States
and defend its rights and interests when they may be affected by a
judicial proceeding in a Unites States court." 304
The court further noted the lack of evidence that the Liberian corpora-
tion was "not so independent from the Liberian government as it claims
to be," in which case the decision may have been different. 305
D. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
A request for jurisdictional discovery is common in FSIA cases, where
a plaintiff may require further fact-finding to establish that the foreign
entity falls within one of the exceptions to immunity. This follows the
burden-shifting applicable at the initial stages of an FSIA action, where
first "the plaintiff must overcome the presumption of immunity by pro-
ducing some evidence that the foreign state's conduct falls within a statu-
tory exception," and second, the defendant must "prove the plaintiff's
claims do not fall within an FSIA exception."306 "Jurisdictional discovery
is only available where the plaintiff is able to carry its initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case that jurisdiction exists."307
Because immunity for foreign sovereigns under the FSIA "was meant
to spare foreign states not only from liability on the merits but also from
the cost and inconvenience of trial," courts are often disinclined to re-
quire foreign sovereigns to engage in discovery.308 Further, upon appeal
of a ruling denying jurisdictional discovery, the decision "will not be re-
versed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in
303. Id. at 138 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) ("apply-
ing the 'minimum contacts' test to determine whether a state court could, without
violating the Due Process Clause, exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese
corporation") (emphasis added)).
304. Id. at 140 (citation omitted).
305. Id. at 140-41.
306. Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304-05 (S.D. Fla.)
(finding that "a plaintiff relying on an alter ego theory that is able to allege the
existence of an exception to immunity under the FSIA may be entitled to jurisdic-
tional discovery").
307. Id.
308. Doe v. Holy See, CV 02-430-MO, 2011 WL 1541275 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2011) at *2
(quoting Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117,1127 (9th Cir. 2010));
see also Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 444 F. App'x 469 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming
district court's denial of jurisdictional discovery); Fagan v. Republic of Austria, No.
08-CIV-6715-LTS-JCF, 2011 WL 1197677, at *20 (Mar. 25, 2011) (denying request
for jurisdictional discovery); Sachs v. Republic of Austria, No. C-08-1840, 2011 WL
816854, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011).
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actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant."309 But in
2011, some courts departed from the general reluctance to grant jurisdic-
tional discovery that foreign sovereigns enjoy.310
In Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, the district court
permitted the plaintiff to begin discovery to determine whether the fac-
tual allegations in the complaint would support an exception to sovereign
immunity.311 The plaintiff alleged that the Miccosukee Tribe served his
daughter alcohol at a tribal casino and allowed her to leave in an intoxi-
cated state; the daughter died in a car accident later that evening. 312 The
court determined that the factual allegations in the Complaint were suffi-
cient, "if substantiated through discovery" to establish whether an excep-
tion to the FSIA for this Tribe existed.313
Similarly, in Doe v. Holy See, the district court permitted plaintiff to
take limited jurisdictional discovery to determine the type of employment
relationship the Holy See had over a Catholic priest accused of sexually
molesting plaintiff.314 But the court denied discovery on the commercial
activity exception, as plaintiff could not make out a prima facie showing
of its applicability.315
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Where a foreign sovereign does not answer, or otherwise respond to a
complaint, a court may grant a default judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff.3 1 6 Before a court will enter a default judgment, "the claimant [must]
establish [] his claim or rights to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court."31 7 The court may accept all uncontroverted evidence as true,
"which may take the form of sworn affidavits or prior transcripts[,] ...
judicial notice of findings[,] and conclusions of related proceedings."3 18
Courts also continue to emphasize the importance of proper service as a
foundational requirement prior to entering a default judgment.319
309. Holy See, 2011 WL 1541275, at *2.
310. See, e.g., Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011) (granting request for limited
discovery to determine the existence of jurisdiction).
311. Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, No. 10-24524-CIV-SEITZ, 2011
WL 1303281, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011).
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006)).
314. Doe v. Holy See, CV 02-430-MO, 2011 WL 1541275, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2011).
315. Id. at *3.
316. See, e.g., Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2011)
(finding Iran liable for terrorist acts after entry of default judgment where Iran
failed to respond to Complaint); Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2011).
317. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 764 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126
(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)).
318. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Lib-
yan Arab Jamahiriya, 811 F. Supp. 2d 53, 73 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted).
319. See, e.g., Bleier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, No. 08 C 06254, 2011 WL
4626164, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011) (denying default judgment where foreign
sovereign was not properly served).
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Several cases in 2011 addressed default judgments under the FSIA,
sending cautionary signals to defendants who choose not to respond to
plaintiffs' allegations.320 For example, in Baker v. Socialist People's Lib-
yan Arab Jamahirya, the district court criticized the Syrian defendants for
choosing default as a "litigation strategy," stating:
This is not the first time Syria has done this. Syria has defaulted in
several recent and currently pending cases before this court. In fact,
in reviewing the pending and recent proceedings against Syria on the
court docket, the court is unable to identify a case where Syria has
filed a timely response to a complaint despite receiving proper ser-
vice of process. 321
The Baker court considered two issues in particular, beyond the pure
question of whether a default had occurred: (1) "whether a Magistrate
Judge has authority to enter final judgment in the absence of a party's
explicit consent, where that party has defaulted despite proper service of
process and has failed to appear to contest referral of the case to the
magistrate judge prior to entry of final judgment," and (2) whether the
dismissal of other defendant (Libya) in the lawsuit rendered the Syrian
co-defendants themselves immune from suit under the FSIA. 3 2 2 As to
the first question, the court determined that because the Syrian defend-
ants "received proper service of process and willfully defaulted" more
than once, "defaulting nullifies any right to argue the absence of the mag-
istrate judge's jurisdiction for the first time on appeal." 323 The court held
that a settlement agreement between the United States and Libya that
reinstated Libya's immunity from suit did "not deprive [the court] of ju-
risdiction over the claims by plaintiffs against the Syrian defendants." 3 2 4
Specifically, Syria is not a party to the agreement between the United
States and Libya, and the agreement was not "intended to apply to claims
by United States nationals against states other than Libya." 325
F. VENUE AND FORuM NON CONVENIENS
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(f), claims against a foreign state or politi-
cal subdivision thereof may be brought in the United States District
Court for Columbia, "or any judicial district" in which (1) "a substantial
part of the events . . . or a substantial part of property . . . is situated," (2)
320. See, e.g., Estate of Heiser, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F. Supp. 2d 9, 24
(D.D.C. 2011) ("[T]his action has been proceeding for more than a decade, and yet
in all this time Iran has not appeared to account for its role in the horrific bombing
of the Khobar Towers residential complex. This choice was made despite both
exposure to more than $500 million in damages and evidence that Iran is perfectly
capable of appearing when it wishes. See, e.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
No. 03 Civ. 9370, 2008 WL 192321, at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008).").
321. Baker v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 810 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C.
2011).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 99.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 100.
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"the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated," or (3) "the agency or
instrumentality is licensed to do business." Venue disputes in FSIA litiga-
tion, as in other litigation, typically concern the location where "a sub-
stantial part of the events" occurred.
However, a U.S. court is not guaranteed in an FSIA action. Pursuant
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, where: (a) a claim would im-
pose a serious inconvenience on the defendant, and (b) an adequate al-
ternative forum for the claim exists, a U.S. court may decline to hear the
case. In this situation, the court "must first determine whether an ade-
quate alternative forum for the dispute is available, and if so, whether a
balancing of the private and public interest factors strongly favors dismis-
sal." 3 2 6 The determination is highly discretionary, and a number of courts
in 2011 denied foreign sovereigns' motions to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens. 327
For example, in de Csepel, where plaintiffs sought the return of artwork
from the Republic of Hungary, the defendants argued that the case
should be dismissed because Hungary provided an adequate alternate fo-
rum. Although the Court assumed that to be true, "the Court neverthe-
less conclude[d] that defendants . . . failed to show that the balance of
private and public factors favor[ed] dismissal" on forum non conveniens
grounds.328
Looking at the "private interest" factors, the court noted that language
concerns did not shift the balance in favor of Hungary as many of the
relevant witnesses lived outside of Hungary. The Court also noted that a
judgment would be enforceable in the United States since the court
would be able to attach property owned by Hungary in the United
States.329 With respect to the "public interest" factors, the court found
that Hungary failed to rebut the "strong presumption" that the court
should honor plaintiffs' choice of forum,330 where the U.S. court had an
equal interest in resolving the controversy, and there was no burden on
potential jurors, "as jury trials are not available in suits brought under the
FSIA."331 The Court denied the motion to dismiss. 33 2
326. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 138 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981)).
327. Id.; Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d
689 (N.D. Ill. 2011); reh'g denied, 807 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Thai-Lao Lig-
nite (Thai.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2011 WL
3516154 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011); Cybersitter, LLC v. The People's Republic of
China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Victims of the Hungarian Holocaust
v. Hungarian State Rys., 798 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Cruise Connections
Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Att'y Gen. of Can., 764 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D.D.C. 2011).
328. de Csepel, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
329. Id.
330. Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Re-
public, 2011 WL 3516154, at *9 ("The more it appears that a domestic or foreign
plaintiff's choice of forum has been dictated by reasons that the law recognizes as
valid, the greater the deference that will be given to the plaintiff's forum choice.")
(citation omitted).
331. de Csepel, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (citation omitted).
332. Id.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
G. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Denials of immunity under the FSIA are immediately appealable
under the collateral-order doctrine. In 2011, two circuits addressed issues
relating to such interlocutory appeals.333 The Fourth Circuit addressed
whether it could hear an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss
where the district court had transferred the matter to a district court in
another circuit.334 The Seventh Circuit addressed "[w]hether a collateral
order that is not timely appealed is revived for review when a timely ap-
peal is taken from a later collateral order." 335
In Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, a contractor sued
Iraq for breach of contract.336 Iraq moved to dismiss for, inter alia, lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 337 The Virginia district court denied Iraq's
motion and, in "concluding that venue was improper," transferred the
case to the District of Columbia.338 Iraq appealed to the Fourth
Circuit.339
The Fourth Circuit noted that the transferor court could have aided its
review by either: (1) transferring before reaching the jurisdiction ques-
tion, or (2) staying the transfer order pending consideration of the ap-
peal.3 4 0 Nonetheless, the court determined that it did have jurisdiction
over the appeal because the "immediately appealable" nature of the de-
nial of immunity was "severed from the remainder of the case that trav-
eled to the transferee court." 341
In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, several judgment creditors sought
to satisfy judgments against Iran by attaching Persian antiquities housed
in Chicago museums.342 Iran failed to appear. 343 Though the FSIA, as a
general matter, immunizes foreign sovereigns' assets from attachment,344
the district court held that immunity from attachment must be pled spe-
cially as an affirmative defense. 345 After the thirty-day window for filing
an interlocutory appeal lapsed, 346 the plaintiffs served Iran with discovery
requests "regarding all Iranian-owned assets located anywhere in the
333. See Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205, 209-11(4th Cir. 2011);
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 789-93. The Supreme Court de-
nied both Iraq's and Iran's petitions for writ of certiorari on June 25, 2012. Repub-
lic of Iraq v. Wye Oak Tech., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 38 (2012); Rubin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012).
334. Wye Oak, 666 F.3d at 209.
335. Rubin, 637 F.3d at n. 7.
336. Wye Oak, 666 F.3d at 207.
337. Id. at 208.
338. Id. at 209.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at n. 6. The Fourth Circuit considered that declining jurisdiction "could result
in the district court's decision escaping de novo review entirely."
342. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2011).
343. Id.
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United States." 347 The district court permitted the requests, and Iran ap-
pealed both the discovery order and the prior denial of attachment
immunity.348
After first deciding that the discovery order was immediately appeala-
ble under the collateral order doctrine, 349 the Seventh Circuit then faced
the "trickier" question whether Iran could also appeal the denial of at-
tachment immunity 350-i.e., whether the timely interlocutory appeal of
the discovery order revived the opportunity to appeal the immunity deci-
sion without waiting until final disposition of the case.35' The court de-
cided in favor of Iran:
The failure to timely appeal an immunity order under the collateral-
order doctrine does not necessarily postpone review until the end of
the case; it postpones review until another appealable order is en-
tered. This will usually be the final judgment, but not always. And
here, there is "another appealable order," not the final judgment,
that has provided the next opportunity for review. 3 5 2
The court justified the decision as "sound appellate management" be-
cause the orders involved similar issues related to immunity under the
FSIA.353
347. Id. (emphasis in original).
348. Id.
349. See id. at 790.
350. Id.
351. Id. at n.7.
352. Id. at 791 (quoting Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1990)).
353. Id.
